This paper studies indigenous insurance groups using evidence from urban areas in Benin. Many of these informal institutions co-exist within neighbourhood-distance. They are based on well-defined rules and regulations, offering premium-based insurance for funeral expenses, as well as other forms of insurance and credit to cope with hardships. We provide first a description of these groups. Then we investigate, with the help of an original dataset, which individual characteristics are significant in explaining both the probability to join such groups and the choice of insurance coverage.
Introduction
Groups exist in Benin that offer insurance to their members by providing indemnities for a wide range of shocks, such as funeral expenses. These groups are called in local dialect "nujè mèji gbê", a direct translation of which would be "happiness-unhappiness funds". This paper discusses their functioning and the extent of insurance offered based on a survey in Cotonou, Benin. Along this line we firstly intend to highlight what are the individual characteristics which influence the decision to join these groups and secondly to explain the choice of coverage made by individuals. These indigenous groups were created in response to a risky environment typical of developing countries.
In particular, poor households are highly vulnerable to risk. These households for whom formal insurance contracts costs are prohibitive can only resort on punctual transfers from neighbours, friends or relatives since no other informal institution that we know of offers them insurance. 1 The organisation of these groups can be basically described as follows: usually, a group of people gather on a regular basis. During a meeting members who suffer from an adverse shock can put in a claim to the group for an indemnity according to the nature of the shock. Groups' rules always specify a list of shocks eligible for indemnity as well as the corresponding amount of indemnity offered. Once it has been agreed that a member can receive an indemnity, each member has to provide on the spot an equal amount of cash. A recipient's indemnity is thus the sum of all other members' individual contributions. This process continues until all members have received a fixed number of indemnities, thereby completing a whole cycle. The group may then decide to discontinue or to begin another cycle. Groups vary between one another in terms of number of members, frequency of meetings, variety of shocks for which indemnity is offered, terms of payment and in terms of their operating modes. 2 The extent of experienced risk and how well households did in coping with it has been lengthily analysed in the literature (see Townsend (1994) and Murdoch (1995) for a review).
Indeed, there exists a variety of mechanisms for coping with risk among which risk-sharing arrangements. A number of theoretical papers, such as Kimball (1988) , Coate and Ravallion (1993) , Ligon et al. (1999) , Genicot and Ray (2003) , Bloch et al. (2004) have focused on these self-enforcing risk-sharing arrangements. Such insurance networks, which provide mutual assistance between households, are informal in the sense that they take place outside of the market place and are made without any legal arrangement that could in any way be binding. They are not closed multilateral grouping based on well-defined formal associations that have written rules or regulations governing their operation. Hardship and risk are often difficult to face individually. Thus people voluntarily participate into such arrangements which are sustained over time as they offer higher expected payoff than the one in autarky.
1 Exception made of rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) that are found in those districts but as Dagnelie and LeMay (2007) shows: even if they accommodate some minor insurance aspects in their functioning they are still an imperfect substitute for insurance. 2 Rotating savings and credit associations' (roscas) functioning differs from the one of informal insurance groups. At each rosca's meeting all members contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pot allocated to one of them. The latter is excluded from the reception of the pot in subsequent meetings but is still obliged to contribute to the pot for the rest of the cycle. This process repeats itself until each member has received the pot, a cycle is then being completed. For roscas, timing of the reception pot is not based on insurance needs whereas in insurance groups indemnities are offered only in case of a precise adverse shock. Time duration of a cycle is fixed in case of roscas but unknown for insurance groups.
Empirical research on such mechanisms have focused on arrangements between households being neighbours, living in the same village or having extended familial link but not on well-defined groups or associations formed with the specific aim of providing insurance to their members. Such studies have thus not focused on groups but instead on bilateral arrangements identifying networks of insurance partners (see among others: Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) , Fafchamps and Lund (2003) , Ayalew (2003) , Dercon and De Weerdt (2002) ). What is presented here in this paper is different. It focuses on an analysis of Beninese insurance groups having a clear and well-defined structure. Each group has a defined membership, particular procedures to accept new members and rules such as schedules of payments, specific contributions, sanctions in case of non payment, absenteeism or misbehaviour. These informal insurance groups offer insurance in order to cover entirely or some fraction of funeral costs and numerous other expenses that can arise in case of hardship.
Groups and associations of all kinds are pervasive in developing countries, though our analysis only focuses on those having the specific aim of insuring their members and a well-defined structure. Some papers have also examined such initiatives. For instance Jütting (2003) and Atim (1998) have analysed development initiatives providing health insurance through communitybased organisations. These papers are related to our own apart from a basic difference which makes them distinct: these community-based health insurance initiatives have been initiated by NGOs or health providers such as missionary hospitals whereas informal insurance funds studied here have no such linkage and were created purely by indigenous initiatives.
At present time systematic analyses on such informal insurance groups are scarce. Indeed to our knowledge only present an empirical and analytical analysis of such informal insurance groups. Using evidence from rural areas in Tanzania and Ethiopia, they study indigenous insurance institutions developed to cope with the high costs of funerals. This work comes closest in the literature to the analysis presented here where we use a first hand dataset with urban evidence. Whereas groups in are funeral associations dealing primarily with expenses related to funeral ceremonies, informal insurance groups studied here offer a wider range of coverage and are not solely designed for such events. Discussion in the literature about diversified insurance groups is rare and the same holds for funeral associations: does cite some papers pertaining to the Ethiopian context and Roth (1999) offers some evidence concerning South Africa. As Rutherford (2001) documents, one can find insurance mechanisms for funerals across the developing world. Not only their presence in many areas has been attested and is far from being anecdotal, but also funeral expenditure in much of the developing countries tends to represent a large proportion of households' monthly income.
In the following section we intend to give a description of the data survey on which our analysis is based. We will also present in section 3 the characteristics of our informal insurance groups using our first hand data set. Insurance coverage provided and the basic functioning of these groups will be discussed. We will see that groups are well-organised and structured, with a clearly defined set of rules, regulations and potential sanctions in case of misconduct. Then by using household level data on members and non-members we will highlight some differences in terms of individual characteristics. We will also briefly discuss the motivations for agents to join. In section 4 we present field evidence that describe how individuals within households take the decision to join such groups and how husband and wife interact with each other. In section 5 we formulate conjectures as to what would drive membership and the choice of insurance coverage which we then proceed to test in section 6. The following section analyses the distinction between two types of groups and section 8 concludes.
Description of our Survey
Data used here was collected in spring 2004 in the two districts of Vossa and Enagnon located in the outskirts of Cotonou (a city of about 1.1 million inhabitants) and known to the city's authority as being the poorest. Enagnon is a dense slum located by the Atlantic Ocean shore. It received low attention from the authorities of Cotonou and important sanitary problems have not yet been tackled with. In 1998, half of its area of 60.1 hectares has been divided into plots. Part of Enagnon is called Enagnon-plage inhabited by fishermen living in huts on the beach. Vossa has also a community of fishermen as it is located near an inner bay of fresh water. It also has sanitary problems since its 63 hectares are encircled by stagnating waters which represent an important vector of disease. Vossa has not yet been divided into plots and none of its roads, not even the main avenue, is paved. The district is clearly left to itself. Yearly floods represent an important problem which has not yet been dealt with. Both of these districts are close to downtown Cotonou: a significant part of their inhabitants work and commute on a daily basis. We shall add that no formal saving or insurance institution, either private or public, is present in Vossa or Enagnon. No NGOs initiative has reached these districts either.
We surveyed 496 households: 110 in Vossa and 386 in Enagnon (of which 116 are located in Enagnon-plage). We selected each household randomly. During the first wave of interviews we collected housing information and information on each member: activity, religion, work, education, etc. Enumerators were required, for all members older than fifteen, to fill in a sheet detailing their expenses on durable goods made during the last six months and to report as precisely as possible their expenses on non-durable goods for the week previously ended. During the second wave, only members of informal groups were questioned about the association(s) they belonged to. In order to tackle privately with each agent tricky issues related to expenses or income, all members of each household were interviewed separately throughout the successive waves of our survey.
Particular attention was thus put on confidentiality in order to obtain maximal accuracy and our enumerators strictly abided by those rules. Additional details on our survey methodology can be found in Appendix 9.1.
Overall, the 496 surveyed households represent 2083 individuals. We were left with a sample of 1179 individuals when 894 subjects aged less than sixteen were putted aside. The remaining sample divided into 604 women and 575 men. In Table 1 we show relevant statistics according to gender and participation status. These statistics are used as variables on which is based the econometric analysis that follows. A detailed description of some of these variables can be found in Appendix 9.2. We see that 214 individuals representing 18% of all surveyed observations kept are members of at least one insurance group. Various reasons may explain this low participation rate.
In Cotonou, other formal and informal ways of getting insured are available, along with different saving vehicles which are accessible so that agents can cope individually with adverse shocks.
Additionally, problems of adverse selection are important in the context of a large city where it can be difficult to put pressure on defaulting members or to trace the author of embezzlement. Even though they have established rules for selecting new members, informal insurance groups are perceived with some suspicion by many. True or fictitious anecdotes of defaulting members or group disintegrating ensuing embezzlement can be heard frequently by people for motivating their non-participation. There is rarely social pressure on individual to join a group, except for rare cases of groups based on family membership. So individuals and households living in city districts that we surveyed are by no mean ostracized if they decide not to join any group and opt for another form of insurance. Thus multiple memberships are not frequent: only 7 individuals declared being member of 3 different groups and 19 of two different groups.
From our overall sample we find that men are significantly more educated and earn a larger income than women. There is also a larger proportion of salaried males. On average women have a larger number of dependants. By comparing 3 both samples of non-members to members of at least one group, with respect or not to gender, we find that members are older, live in couple in a larger proportion and have a greater number of dependants. Members are significantly less educated but they have on average greater stability in their income earning activity as a larger proportion of members have been having their current job for at least twenty-four months. There is no significant difference in the proportion of salaried individuals between members and non members. In both cases, the vast majority of individuals are self-employed earning their income from petty retail, fishing, taxi services or various manual jobs. Most importantly, on average members have a larger income and their income distribution is skewed towards the right compared to non-members. Indeed only 2% of all individuals having income in the lowest quintile are members whereas 31% of individuals in the highest income quintile are members. Clearly memberships of informal insurance groups are not composed of the poorest of the poor. Informal insurance groups seem not to have been designed to target the most needy. Many of them impose discriminating entry requirements that we describe in the following section. Groups also impose regular payouts on members that are often difficult if impossible to meet for very poor individual or individuals with widely varying income (see Dercon and Krishnan (2004) on problems related to targeting).
Description of Insurance Groups
By going through the statistics given in Table 2 Indemnities offered by one group are often allocated cyclically. This is done in order to equilibrate the total amount of indemnities allocated between members. About three groups out of four fix a limit number of indemnities that can be received by one member, this number being the same for everyone. Once a member has attained the ceiling he has to wait until all the other members have also received this number of indemnities to be eligible again for assistance. As such, cycles have no fixed duration in time. Usual ceiling of indemnities that we encountered were 2, 3 or 4 for each "happy" and "unhappy" events or both together. These limitations can be seen as a mechanism providing some sort of balanced reciprocity (see Platteau (1997) "kèsi gbigba". This is a special meeting were the remains of their cashboxes (or part of it) is redistributed among members (17% of groups) or also frequently used for organising a celebration or both. Such special meeting is either organised at the end of a calendar year (59% of groups) so that money is available for members during this period of celebrations or at the end of a cycle (27%). Kèsi gbigba is also a time for rejoicing and showing non members how successful a group is.
Strict accounting is done on premiums paid by members as well as on indemnities allocated so that what goes in and out of the cashbox is carefully registered. Table 3 shows that indemnities are offered for two broad categories of events. Groups themselves refer to happy and unhappy events ("nun gnangnan" and "nun dagbé") and their rules stipulate in which case an indemnity is to be allocated and how much. A small fraction of groups offer indemnities for all cases listed. As we see "death of a member's close relative", "death of a member" and "illness of a member" represent the most cited coverage offered. The first one being for some groups their raison d'être: they started by offering solely indemnities for funerals and then expanded the range of coverage. During informal discussions, members reported that funeral of a close relative represents the most important expense they faced. Accordingly coverage for such events is the largest. Out of 1179 individuals aged higher than sixteen that were surveyed: 51% made expenses related to funeral and/or illness during last six months. How important can the coverage be for one household?
Compared to their average monthly income of 63 845 CFA (median = 46 584 CFA), individuals spent a monthly mean of 7480 CFA on funerals and 4280 CFA on illness (averages made over the last six months). These two expenses together represent 35% of all durable expenses made by one individual. 7 All indemnities offered in case of a "happy" event aim at covering the costs of a ceremony or a celebration ranging from baptism, marriage, birth to anniversary.
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Groups have different ways of coping with defaulting members unable to pay premium or indemnity. Sanctions range from exclusion (32% of groups), imposing fines or excluding the member from kèsi gbigba (27%), refusing to indemnify the member until he pays his due (20%) or giving additional delay after public warnings (7%) to ultimately bring the case in front of a competent local court of justice (3%). Some groups use more than one of these sanctions in combination. Sanctions do not only have a financial impact: a defaulting member will often feel ashamed of facing public warning or reprimands. This information will spread rapidly in the neighbourhood and may prevent him from joining other groups in the district. Indeed, before accepting a new member a large majority of groups carry an investigation on the applicant's previous memberships. Sanctions such as warnings and fines made publicly can thus have long lasting "social" impacts by giving the applicant a bad reputation. In order to impose sanctions groups use different means of pressure: help of local chiefs or police (43% of groups), threats and public warnings (22%) and eventually assets seizure (9%).
Decision to Join
During our survey, we carried out several informal meetings with people which highlighted that spouses were secretive with one another concerning financial matters. As detailed in LeMay (2007), a large proportion of them with whom we discussed in Vossa and Enagnon said that their spouse was unaware of the course of their occupational activities and was thus unable to guess their income. No matter the gender or age or the respondent, many said: "the less he/she knows about my activities, the better it is." We also frequently heard statements such as: "I don't want him/her to know my income otherwise he/she will ask me to meet the cost of such and such Couples can thus be seen as an arrangement made in order to provide for children's needs and for each member's needs in public goods. Contributions to public goods are often made in 7 In order to get a very rough idea of what funeral expenses can represent: buying a standard coffin in Cotonou amounts to about 90 000 CFA, an almost compulsory beef for celebration 100 000 CFA and standard hearse costs 30 000 CFA. Total expenses for a funeral ceremony can easily amount 6 to 10 times one's monthly income. In Roth (1999) it is said that the poor in South Africa spend approximately 15 times their average monthly income on funerals. 8 For groups having a limit of indemnities per member for both happy and unhappy events together, payouts for such ceremonies are sometimes used to accelerate the completion of a cycle. They are granted to a member who has not attained his ceiling of indemnities while the rest of the group has. 9 LeMay (2007) substantiates this dichotomy between wife and husband finances inside couples using this large scale survey. He presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of spouses' pattern of consumptions and a review of the anthropological literature pertaining to that issue in West-Africa. Evidence tends to show that Benin according to social norms fixing the intra-household allocation of expenses on different items according to gender (for a detailed anthropological account of this see Falen 2003) . Concerning expenses related to unhappy events, for which coverage is offered by insurance groups, a certain gender pattern can be identified. For "destruction of professional belongings / house" and "death of a member's close relative" entailing a funeral ceremony, males often bear a larger burden of expenses, but still, females are often asked for contribution. Expenses incurred by illness in one household are male's responsibility but can be shared among spouses or paid by the one having access to the required sum. This comes from the fact that traditionally the husband has the breadwinner status. However, for the majority of coverage for happy events, related to the organisation of ceremonies or parties, no specific sharing rules exist to our knowledge. Thus with respect to coverage offered and social norms in the provision of public goods we could expect that men would be slightly more likely to participate. But still this has to be nuanced. Coverage also applies to expenses not related to the household. Indeed friends or close relatives of one spouse (non member of the household or of the extended family) can be helped if necessary so that man and woman can be equally appealed to by their friends.
We also investigated motives for joining by asking all members "what were the reason(s)
why they joined such a group?" Each was allowed multiple answers to this open question. Basically the 214 members of our dataset gave two answers : 97% answered "getting indemnity in cases of need", thus clearly underlining the need of insurance in case of hardship. The second given by 75% of all members was "to get moral support from other members". This underlines the importance of social dynamic and cohesion within one group. Almost all groups hold regular meetings during which indemnities are allocated and discussions on several matters that affect members are raised.
It often happens that members also spend time playing music or perpetuating folkloric activities.
While this paper does not investigate insurance funds as sociologists would, from our investigation and some meetings we attended to, it comes as no surprise that social links are important in driving and maintaining membership. Moreover it regularly happens that indemnities, especially for funerals, are given by the entire group or by a delegation at the ceremony to show their solidarity.
Another answer provided by only 3% of all members to this question was "to discipline my saving".
What is interesting to highlight here is that while about three quarters of all groups ask for regular premiums to be paid, members do not see insurance funds as a pure device for disciplining savings as is the case for roscas 10 . This happens partly because timing of reception of indemnity is not known in many cases. Also because a large proportion of these premiums are small and larger contributions are expected upon request. This entails that periodicity of important payments are not known in a majority of groups. From the preceding description, we could also suspect someone to join an insurance group in order to hide money from his/her spouse. However, according to our evidence, insurance groups are not used for such purpose. Indeed only 12% of all fund participations are unknown by spouses. This is partly due to the fact that 54% of funds allowing females require the agreement of husbands upon entry. Moreover, we know that 60% of all regular contributions to insurance groups (premiums) are known by spouses.
individual earnings are largely protected from spouse pressure. Husband and wife have a limited ability to bias his/her partner's expenditures both for private and public goods. 10 See Dagnelie and LeMay (2007) for an analysis on why people join a rosca.
Conjectures
Important implications can be derived from the interaction among household members we depicted earlier. We can predict that the probability of joining an insurance group does not depend on whether an individual is single or in a couple and neither does it depend on each spouse's bargaining power within the couple. As we said a great deal of latitude is left to both husband and wife in terms of managing their income, net of expenses on public goods and deciding if they are going to join a group or not. This decision, thus the probability of joining an insurance group, depends on their available income, net of expenses on public goods and on other relevant individual characteristics. We proceed by making simple predictions on the effects of these variables.
Most of the households we surveyed have restricted ability to borrow or finance consumption. They would thus face difficulties in smoothing their consumption if confronted to a shock. In our discussion, risk for individuals has two aspects: fluctuation in income itself and potential obligations of disbursements in case of "happy" or unhappy" events. For a given level of fluctuation in revenues, income should positively influence the probability of joining. This, at least for low level of income, can be assumed since insurance can be thought of as a normal good for poor people highly vulnerable to potential disbursements. Indeed if income rises, one might get incited to join a group in order to make precautionary savings either through payments of a premium or through regular payouts. Membership would grant indemnities that would allow some consumption-smoothing in case of need. However we expect that very rich individuals would rather opt for formal insurance contracts or would more easily be able to cope individually with adverse shocks. Such contracts through a private firm are more secure an arrangement than any informal group can offer. So for very high levels of income we expect the probability of joining to fall, leading to an overall inverted-U shape curve with respect to income.
Age should also follow a quadratic pattern: the needs to insure would be maximised for middle aged individuals establishing and having family and would be expected to diminish as age increases. Indeed, as children become independent coverage for some happy events becomes useless. Moreover middle aged individuals are the most likely to be requested to contribute to funeral ceremonies, mainly organised for parents or parents in law, or for any other adverse shocks. It is customary to rely on them for such disbursements and they often face intense pressure (see Falen 2003) . The number of dependants should have a positive effect on the probability of joining an insurance group. A larger number of children (or relatives depending on the household's head) would give higher incentives to parents to insure in order to be able to face potentially more future shocks. However for a given income, more dependants may reduce capacity to save and thus the probability of joining.
In the light of Deaton (1991) , risk averse households with precautionary motive for savings and maximizing their expected utility over time would tend to save more if risk in fluctuating income increases. Given a certain risk of disbursement shock, more uncertain income would mean a greater probability of joining and also opting for a greater coverage. Alternatively, intuition would tell us that individuals with stable source of income would not need such an insurance device and would cope with disbursements shocks by themselves. With these reasoning our two variables describing job stability, which can be taken as proxies of income stability, should be negatively linked to the probability of joining. A contrasting view would say that more stable income entries over the past means that an individual expects to be able to commit himself more easily to regular payments of premiums and indemnities. Income stability, through lower risk of default, would have a positive impact on the probability of joining. Moreover, certain insurance groups are more inclined to accept members that have a regular and secure source of income in order to reduce adverse selection problems (see Section 3). That would be an extra effect favouring a positive effect of income stability on the probability of joining. To check which of these two opposite effects dominates, we use two binary variables shown in Table 1 that are proxies for income stability:
"same job for at least 24 months" and "salaried" which takes value one if an individual is salaried and zero if self-employed. Both variables are defined in details in Section 9.2.
Let's recall that coverage is the sum of all individual payouts, stipulated in the rules, given to one requesting member. So for high coverage one must join a group where individual payouts are high or a group with a large membership or both. The capacity to contribute to payouts is positively linked to income. We expect that for low level of income, richer individuals will opt for larger coverage. Again we can guess that very rich individuals would rather opt for formal insurance contracts. So it is likely that both probability of joining and coverage are concave in income as less risky opportunities become available with very high income. In the next section we confront our predictions with empirical findings obtained from our Beninese database.
Empirical Results
We test our predictions with our data by estimating participation and coverage with the Heckman two-step procedure. As people self-select their participation to a group, the observations taken into account in the structural equation are not a random sample. In fact, we suspect unobserved individual characteristics to influence both the probablility to join and the size of coverage chosen. We have therefore to tackle the problem of selection bias, producing inconsistent estimates, induced by the correlation between the error term and the regressors. Heckman twostep procedure addresses this problem by estimating the selection and structural equations, allowing residuals to be correlated. Moreover we introduced fixed effects removing the area-specific component from the residuals and eliminating the endogeneity caused by unmeasured area characteristics. Table 4 gives empirical estimates with respect to participation which is the dependent variable of the first step. We regress alternatively with respect to the whole sample size and then with a subset incorporating only members of a couple. 11 We control for ethnic affiliation as these variables can be seen as very rough proxies for social identification and networking. A look at both 11 See Appendix 9.2 for a detailed description of some of the independent variables.
regressions results show that two ethnic variables (Goun and Popo) are positive and significant.
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Why Goun and Popo people are more willing to join groups is difficult to answer. It may have to do with the fact that both ethnic groups do not originated from Cotonou, as is the case for Fon, and that members of these communities would tend to gather between themselves. Neighbourhoods are also controlled for and account for all potential interactions and effects specific to Vossa and Enagnon (Enagnon-plage is included in the constant term). The district fixed effects are not significant suggesting that unobserved factors specific to each neighbourhood are not important. As shown in Table 1 , individuals in our sample tend to have a rather long stay in their respective neighbourhoods with a mean of almost sixteen years. Movements across neighbourhoods and migration are much more of an exception rather than the rule. This may explain why the dummy variable "Same neighbourhood for at least 24 months" is not significant for both samples.
We include additional regressors such as the number of dependants. This variable's coefficient is positive but only significant for the sub sample of members of couple. In this case the marginal effect of one additional dependant in the household is rather small: an increase of 1.6%
on the probability of joining a group. 13 This weakly confirms our interpretations presented before:
a larger number of dependants means higher potential risk of facing adverse shocks and greater need for insurance. We check whether education has any effect: it appears not to have one as the variable "Has no education" is not significant in both samples. Income stability which we partly measure by whether one has kept his present job for at least 24 months, positively affects the probability to join an insurance group only for the entire sample. Having the same job for at least 24 months increases the probability of joining a group by 3.6%. Being salaried (not self-employed)
is however not significant. Overall these two results would tend to weakly favour the second intuition we presented earlier. However we are unable to disentangle between the effects from groups' rules or one's ability to commit.
Being house owner has a significant and relatively strong impact on participation: it increases the probability of being member by 5.2%. Provision of coverage against "destruction of professional belongings / house" may attract owners. Moreover, possessing a house greatly facilitates the grant of membership since in case of dispute a house owner has less chance of fleeing. It gives additional guarantee to a group in case of default. As anticipated, group participation is quadratic in income. However the maximum is reached at a very high level of income indicating that for most of our sample the probability increases in income. Indeed only 46 individuals out of 1179 have a larger income than the maximum of this quadratic function. An increase in income of 1000 CFA increases probability to join by 0.17%. The income variable used in all our regressions is a measure of monthly individual income earned plus transfers. Our inverted-U shape prediction concerning age is also verified but only in the case where the whole sample is used: the relationship begins to decrease at 44 years of age. 14 Marginal effect of additional year is 1.6% on the probability of being member. This tends to confirm that demand for insurance 12 Taken together the three variables representing ethnic affiliation are jointly significant. Not a majority of groups are designed along specific ethnic patterns. Out of the 49 groups restricted to only one ethnic affiliation, which represent only 23% of all groups, 19 are restricted to Popos and 16 to Gouns. 13 Marginal effects are computed at the means of the independent variables. 14 Note that 2003 estimates for the life expectancy at birth in Benin is 53 years. (Worldbank, 2005) .
disbursements (such as funerals ceremonies) is increasing among young agents and decreases as they get older.
Coefficients displayed for the overall sample also show that neither couple nor the interaction variable between female and couple are significant. This confirms that decision to participate is not influenced by marital status. Bargaining power within couple proxied by the variable female share of household income (which is female's income divided by the sum of both spouses' income) and its square to allow for quadratic interaction are not significant. These results provide evidence in favour of the decision framework we depicted where the decision to join an insurance group is individual and independent of marital status considerations. 15 Contrary to the estimates for the overall sample where gender is non significant, estimates for the restricted sample of members of couples show that other things being equal men would be more likely to participate, the marginal effect being 7.8%. This result is in line with the breadwinner status that traditionally the husband has. In our previous discussion with respect to expenses related to happy or unhappy events and social norms, we stated that male could be more likely to join insurance groups. Results displayed in Table 4 are robust to various changes in specification notably when quadratic terms for age, income or female share of income are omitted. shock, it reflects the size of insurance. We show estimates based on a coverage index which is the average of indemnities for the three most widely indemnified "happy" and five "unhappy" events.
We also carried estimations with two other coverage indexes: one being an average of all coverages listed above in Table 3 and one being an average for a subset of three "unhappy" events only. Results that we show hold for those three indexes. We use coverage index because we can compute such value for all groups and thus for all 224 members included in our second step. Using premiums paid by members instead would have diminished the sample size since only three quarters of all groups require such payment. Individuals can belong to several groups, which is the case for 12% of all members in our sample. In those cases coverage computed is the sum of all groups' respective payouts. By looking at Table 5 we see that personal characteristics such as gender, marital status, age, education, female share of household income, job stability, education and being salaried have no significant effect on coverage chosen by one member. From our two different sets of estimates only two variables are driving the decision with respect to the size of coverage: income and the number of dependants. These results are intuitive knowing that both decisions to join and to contribute seem independent as we show below. Once an individual has decided to join a group based on his personal characteristics, he will decide the size of insurance according to his income. Higher income would potentially lead an agent to save more and thus allow him to pay larger premiums and indemnities. We could also expect that a very wealthy agent would at some point turn to formal insurance and reduce informal coverage. However this effect does show up only slightly: income square is significant but choice of coverage remains increasing 15 We also ran two tests of joint significance on coefficients of couple and female*couple and on female share and female share square. Results do not allow us to reject joint non-significance at a 10% level for both tests.
in income for most of our sample. The maximum of our quadratic inverted U-shape curves for both samples are reached at high level indicating that for most of our sample coverage increases in income. Intuitively having more children or dependants would tend to reduce savings for a given income and thus reduce coverage. Alternatively it would mean facing greater risk of shocks thus asking for a larger coverage. Results tend to support the first interpretation: coefficients are negative and significant only for the overall sample. District fixed effects are irrelevant in explaining the size of coverage. Dummies for house ownership and ethnic affiliation were discarded of the second step to identify the probability of joining a group in the first stage of the estimation.
When added into the second step, these variables are insignificant. Empirical results are in accordance with our rationale: marital status and female share of household income are non significant indicating that the decision made on the size of coverage is individual. Estimates from Table 4 and 5 show that secrecy allow spouses to make individual decisions first on whether or not to commit themselves to an insurance group and second to what extent they will insure. As a way to check robustness, alternative estimates for this second step regression are given in Table 5a .
Results from an OLS on restricted sample including only members and a Tobit estimation are roughly similar.
The inverse Mill's ratio is not a significant variable in determining the size of coverage. This suggests that the decisions to join a group and the choice of coverage are independent. This may be due to the fact that an agent has the choice among a set of insurance groups in his neighbourhood and others known through colleagues, friends or relatives and that the selection among these is made with respect to the indemnities offered. Being familiar with other members is the predominant criterion in group selection. Indeed in our sample 72% of all members said that they had selected the group they are in because they knew or had links with other members. The second most cited answer to "why did you choose this specific insurance group?" is because its president was known for well managing the group (18%) and following in importance is the fact the group was affiliated to a church (6%). Once individuals have identified groups in which they are familiar with some or all members and likely to trust them, they will join the one more suitable to their preferred level of insurance.
It can be argued that group participation can influence one's income, not directly since premiums paid bear no interest; and with strict accounting members receive in indemnity the equivalent sum disbursed in payouts, but indirectly through social connections or others beneficial side effects. About 45% of all 214 members answer that they experienced some extra economical advantages by participating in an insurance group: 22% say that fellow members prefer to buy at their shop or doing business with them and 12% say that they have met their employer (past or present) in the group. These answers tend to confirm that insurance groups provide social connectedness and that they can bring additional advantages. However measuring the importance of these side effects is practically impossible. To account for such potential benefits on income and thus endogeneity with respect to the probability of joining a group we have carried out the same Heckman two-step regressions as in Table 4 and 5 by replacing income with expenditures on non
Introducing sampling weights to reflect the fact that we surveyed in different areas of Cotonou does not change our results.
durable goods (food and other weekly expenses such as gas for cooking, transportation, etc). This way we instrument income by a variable which can be considered as independent of such extra benefits. Results from these regressions (not shown) are similar to the ones already displayed.
Comparing Groups According to their Payment Mode
The previous analysis considered only two options for one individual: either joining or not an insurance group. We could also interpret the choice one individual faces differently. One important distinction between groups arises from the timing of payment of contributions to the group. Indeed 26% of groups, which we denominated as type 1, do not impose any payment of premium and members only contribute in case of emergency. That is to say only when help is granted to one individual, members are asked to pay their share, thus they are only making expost payments. A type 3 group, 22% of all groups, imposes to their member the payment of a regular premium which covers entirely the payouts. In this case payouts are thus paid ex-ante an emergency. Slightly more than half (52%) of all groups are of type 2 which is a hybrid of both type 1 and 3. They impose regular payment of a premium but these contributions are not sufficient to cover the payouts and thus members are also asked to pay on the spot in case of emergency. Thus members of a type 2 group are making ex-ante and ex-post payments. In what follows we aim at analysing the decision to join a group according to these different types: either one individual decides not to join, or opt for a specific type.
16 Table 6 shows group characteristics with respect to their type. According to our t-tests numerous differences exist between types. Not surprisingly ex-ante contributions are larger for type 3 groups compared to type 2 groups (as defined type 1 does not impose ex-ante payments).
Type 2 and 3 groups all have regular meetings, which is not the case for type 1. This is simply explained by the fact that in all groups of type 2 and 3 premiums are paid during meetings. Some type 1 groups only meet when an emergency is declared. Proportion of groups offering lending is also positively linked to the importance of ex-ante payments. This comes as no surprise since these type 2 and 3 groups have larger sum of money available in their cashboxes. Also, groups of type 2 and 3 also more frequently redistribute assets ("kèsi gbigba"). In all groups types a similar fraction have fixed a finite duration and democratically elects new members and their president. Type 3 groups are significantly more inclined than the others to check the veracity of a member's request before allowing a payout. What may appear as a surprise is the fact that there is no significant difference between the proportion of groups imposing entry fees (and the conditional mean of those fees) between type 1 and type 3 groups. One would have expected to find this feature more often for type 1 groups since it could serve to reduce the probability of defaulting members. Indeed members of type 2 and 3 groups have additional incentive to stay in the group since they make regular contributions to the cashbox. Moreover, there is no significant difference between types written rules and status and sanctions in case of defaults (described in Section 3). Proportion of groups having a majority of their members in the neighbourhood is similar for type 1 and 3 groups.
A significantly lower proportion of type 1 groups has their rules approved by the neighbourhood's chief and imposes cycles. Despite that, type 1 groups show a similar mean duration as type 3 groups and a larger one than type 2. All this seems to suggest that there is not much difference in terms of monitoring and prevention of potential moral hazard between types, and if there would be one it would be surprisingly in disfavour of type 1 groups. With respect to differences between type 2 and type 3 groups: they appear to be largely similar.
In her theoretical work on mutual savings groups and risk-sharing arrangements, Bold (2006) analyses the effect of ex-ante transfers on group stability and the extent of insurance. From her model and simulations she formulates predictions that our data allow us to test. Her first conjecture says that insurance groups holding assets and charging ex-ante transfers should on average have larger membership. According to our data there is no significant difference in terms of membership between all three types and thus no evidence of a positive link between the importance of ex-ante transfers and size of groups. Her second prediction states that insurance groups holding assets and charging ex-ante transfers should offer larger coverage than those that do not. We also carefully checked for differences in coverage offered between our three group types. For this we looked at differences in our tree coverage indexes, we also tested conditional and unconditional mean of coverage for each specific case for which insurance is granted (see Table 3 ) and also tested difference in proportion of groups providing each specific coverage. The conclusion is that overall groups offer similar coverage: there is no significant positive correlation between the size of ex-ante transfers and the size of insurance provided. Such similitude between groups may appear as surprising. We provide below some explanations for such results.
We now want to see if incorporating these group distinctions brings additional insight to our initial estimations that are presented in Section 6. As a first approach we pose that the base choice for an individual is not to join any group with now two alternative choices: joining a type 1 or joining either a type 2 or type 3 group. From our previous analysis, the distinction between types 2 and 3 appears tenuous and regrouping them provides initial results. 18 Table 7 shows results of a multinomial logit regression. Results are displayed for the whole sample (first two columns) and for coupled members only (last two columns). We have incorporated in this model the same regressors as in the first step of our previous Heckman two-step procedure. Results in terms of significance are comparable: important variables driving membership are income, age, being house owner and job stability. New significant variables for type 2 and 3 option are education and female (for both samples). We compared the values of coefficients between alternative choices in order to check if there is any significant difference. For the whole sample we found only one significant difference for education. For the sample composed of members of couple only age and age square are 17 Entry requirement is an index which represents the sum of all conditions that a new entrant most satisfies. See Appendix 9.2 for a detailed description of this variable. 18 We carried out an Hausman test on the assumption of the independence of irrelevance alternatives (IIA) for each possible omitted category and we could not reject the null hypothesis of independence. Moreover multinomial probit regressions that we ran with the same variables show very similar results.
significantly different. Jointly both sets of coefficients are similar for both samples. What these results suggest -having in mind that they have to be interpreted with great care since uncensored samples are small-is that variables impacts are largely similar on the probability of joining either a type 1 or type 2 and 3 group. With respect to income, similarity might be due to the fact that since insurance coverage is not significantly different across groups, regular ex-post transfer requires an equivalent income compared to regular ex-ante transfers. As a second step we run multinomial regressions having now three alternatives choices corresponding to each type. 19 Results (not shown) -again to be interpreted with caution-do not bring much additional insight compared to the previous multinomial analysis as to what variables drive membership and in terms of confirming or not conjectures stated in section 5. Jointly the three sets of coefficients are similar.
For the overall sample the only coefficient which significantly differs across choices is salaried though remaining not different from zero for all options.
Treating all three types differently does not bring much refinement to the analysis.
Similarities in descriptive statistics of individuals according to their type affiliation 20 and results from the multinomial logit regression raise the question as to why there are so few differences in terms of membership and variables driving it across group types. The fact that there are several similarities in group characteristics across types is certainly not alien to this. Moreover one thing that makes this analysis tricky is the widespread presence of secondary contributions. This renders the distinction between groups less obvious. It is also plausible to think that individuals make only minor distinction between a premium and regular ex-post transfers. Both require a certain degree of regularity in payments from members, this being particularly true in large groups where demand for indemnities occurs frequently. This resemblance is reinforced by the fact that coverages are not significantly different for all types. Furthermore as we saw the major reason for group selection is the familiarity with other members; payment or not of a premium did not appear at all as a crucial factor. This certainly explains part of the multinomial regressions results and the fact that members across types are not significantly different.
Explaining similarity in terms of structure and characteristics of groups across types on the basis of our data would be far fetched. Our questionnaire did not included question on the reasons motivating groups design and functioning. We did not spend time with groups founding members to cover this issue. Nonetheless we observed some clusters of resembling groups. Field observations and interviews with locals gave us the impression that new born groups can act simply by mimicking the structure and rules of successful and often neighbouring associations. Still this issue has to be studied with more attention and would need additional field investigations.
Thus we are limited in explaining why some groups impose ex-ante payouts and others not.
Imposing premiums can be conceived as a mean to deal with adverse selection issue. We would then observe alternative means for dealing with selection for groups of type 1 and 2 which does not appear to be the case. There is no difference between entry requirements and sanctions across 19 Again we carried out an Hausman test on the assumption of the independence of irrelevance alternatives (IIA) for each possible omitted category and we could not reject the null hypothesis of independence. Moreover multinomial probit regressions that we ran with the same setting show similar results. 20 We checked for differences in individual characteristics between members of all three types of groups and found none to be significant at ten percent except that members of type 3 are significantly more salaried.
types and neither with respect to group duration. 21 At very first look it does not appear to be primarily intended for selection. It could aim at attracting a specific clientele, creaming the poorest unable to pay regular premiums. However, this does not come out of our empirical analysis: there is no income difference across memberships, only do we find that there is a larger proportion of salaried members in type 3 groups.
Conclusion
This paper has analysed a type of local institution that is largely understudied in the development literature: indigenous informal associations with a focus on insurance. These groups not only offer funeral insurance, but also provide indemnities in a substantial number of cases:
illnesses (hospitalisation and medication costs), fire and house damages, loss of a job and as well as for covering the costs of festivities such as baptism, marriages, etc. About a third of them even offer short term credit to their members. Our empirical evidence tend to show that insurance group participation is not a gender issue in Cotonou and that the decision to join such group is made individually in such a way that each spouse retains the control over his/her spending. This has to be taken into account by policies that would be designed to favour any gender participation. Our investigations underline that group participation and choice of coverage in Cotonou is primarily driven by income and that group selection is made on the basis of social connectedness. We also found overall small significant differences in terms of characteristics between groups classified in three types according to the importance of ex-ante transfers. Moreover variables influencing participation for each specific groups underlined by our multinomial regressions are broadly similar to the results we obtained in the first stage of our Heckman two-step estimates.
Up to now there has been no initiative in Cotonou by government-led institution to establish new groups or even to help scaling-up existing ones. Nevertheless these institutions represent a unique way to reach relatively poor people. The strong networks roscas and insurance groups represent in those districts should be considered as a serious asset. Because they are known, well established and experienced institutions, they are likely to reach underprivileged households at a relatively low cost. Would they be offered appropriate financial support they could potentially contribute to development and finance activities in a sustainable way. Projects favouring the establishment of new or existing insurance services for poor people should be based on accessibility and thus requiring payments of low premiums or ex-post transfers. That would then make possible to reach the most needy and raise the overall relatively low level of participation that we observed in Cotonou (18%). Pooling numerous individuals of the same neighbourhood could greatly improve the extent of insurance. In the face of obvious needs, such projects in Vossa and Enagnon, and certainly in other poor areas of Cotonou, would most probably meet with success.
21 When comparing durations, means are computed only on existing groups. We did not survey groups that have ceased their activities. A more valid analysis of groups' duration would require such data.
9. Appendix
Survey Methodology
We selected households according to a random process. We succeeded in obtaining a map of Enagnon and performed there a selection of lots according to an implemented random process.
It often happens that many households live on the same lot in semi-detached rooms. Enumerators selected one room on a lot according to a clock-wise selection varying from lot to lot (for the first lot of the day they selected the first room clock-wise, for the second one the second room clockwise and so on). In Enagnon-plage and Vossa we used a pseudo-random process by which every tenth lot according to a specific direction was picked and then room selections were done in a similar fashion as in Enagnon. Overall only 3 households categorically refused to be surveyed and were replaced by other randomly selected households. Enumerators were asked to pass several times and at different moments of the day, until contacts were established in such a way that none of the selected household was skipped. The most qualified of our enumerators also acted as a supervisor and visited many households already interviewed in order to check the accuracy of the responses. Other than that we analysed every completed questionnaire closely. Several appointments were held with each team of enumerators and in case of incoherence or lack of answers we regularly sent them back on the field. Questionnaires often needed successive rounds of checks until final approval. As mentioned above we emphasized the fact that the interview with every single household member had to be carried in his/her sole presence in order to get as precise and reliable information as possible. Fear of divulging information in front of other members would have led individuals to lie or to refuse to answer. On average our four teams of two enumerators completed two questionnaires a day. The taking account of intra-household secrecy greatly lengthened the survey by requiring specific appointments with each adult member.
Another time consuming factor was the detailed part of our questionnaire concerning groups: we often needed more than an hour for a single group. We compensated every household for their precious time by donating 1500 francs CFA. Finally, with two previous missions, in 2002 and 2003, we carried out about eighty group interviews. We attended regular meetings or met members of their governing body in order to get a better understanding of their functioning.
Definitions of Key Variables
In couple: Individual having a partner (married or not) who is member of the household.
Those who were engaged in a couple for whom the spouse was not living in the household and for whom we did not have any data were not considered to live in couple.
Salaried: Individual is salaried if he/she receives a salary on a regular basis (either daily, weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, bi-monthly, etc) in the formal or informal sector. Only 12% of all individuals are salaried and there is an important gender difference: 22% of men are salaried and only 3% of women. Women are massively self-employed in our sample.
Monthly individual income:
Monthly sum for each individual of all income-generating activities including those from formal and informal sectors and those from self-employed activities.
It also included earnings from interest on loans made, rents on house or apartment and received transfers. In our overall sample only 10% work in the formal sector, being either employed privately or by the state.
Number of dependants:
Total number of people within the household depending financially on either member of the head couple. It is thus the sum of children (aged less than sixteen years), young adults having no revenues or any other depending relatives. For example a member of the extended family moving in the household and relying on its members for a living is counted as such.
Same job for at least twenty four months: Indicates that one individual has had his/her present principal income generating activity for at least twenty four months.
Monthly individual expenditure:
Monthly extrapolations from the sum of all expenditures made on non durable goods during one week. It includes 1) all expenditures on food (including expenses on heating and cooking such as coal or gas) and 2) luxury expenditures such as cigarettes, alcohol, eating and drinking in hotels and restaurants. 
